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Hedge funds are collective investment vehicles fast becoming popular with high
net worth individuals as well as institutional investors. These are funds that are
often established with a special legal status that allows their investment managers
a free hand to use derivatives, short sell and exploit leverage to raise returns and
cushion risk. Given that they have substantial latitude to invest, it is instructive to
examine the performance of hedge funds as compared to other forms of managed
funds. This paper provides an overview of hedge funds and discusses their empir-
ical risk and return proles. It also poses some concerns regarding the empirical
measurements. Given the complexity of hedge fund investments, meaningful ana-
lytical methods are required to provide greater risk transparency and performance
reporting. Hedge fund performance is also beset by a number of practical issues
generating \practical risks". These risks are not fully addressed by the usual risk-
adjusted performance measures in the literature. A penalty function to discount
these extraneous risk dimensions is proposed. The paper concludes that further
empirical work is required to provide informative statistics about the risk and
return of hedge funds.
Keywords: Hedge funds; Risk management; Performance measurement; Nonnormal
distribution; Hurst Ratio; Risk penalty function.
1. Background
Since the early 1990s, there has been a growing interest in the use of hedge
funds amongst both institutional and high net worth individuals. Due to
its private nature, it is dicult to obtain adequate information about the
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operations of individual hedge funds and reliable summary statistics about
the industry as a whole.
Hedge funds are known to be growing in size and diversity. As at the end
of 1997, the MAR/Hedge database recorded a total of more than 700 hedge
fund managing assets of US$90 billion (see Table 1). This is only a partial
picture of the industry, as many funds are not listed with MAR/Hedge. In
practical terms, it is not easy to estimate the current size of the hedge fund
industry unless all funds are regulated or obligated to register their operations
with a common authority. Brooks and Kat (2001) estimated that, as at April
2001, there are around 6000 hedge funds with an estimated US$400 billion in
capital under management and US$1 trillion in total assets.
While hedge funds are well established in the US and Europe, they have
only begun to grow aggressively in Asia. In the week ending April 30, 2002
alone, 8 new funds were introduced or launched. These were funds initiated by
familiar names like Merrill Lynch, Lazard, Morley, Societe Generale, HSBC
and Crosby. In year 2000, there were some 30 funds that were established.
They attracted about US$600 million in capital. Another 20 hedge funds were
set up in 2001. Many of these were start-ups and founded by talents who were
previously employed by large institutional fund management companies. In
1999, HedgeFund Intelligence launched a new publication, AsiaHedge. Re-
cently, AsiaHedge has also set up 4 Asia-Pacic Hedge Fund Indices, covering
Table 1. MAR Hedge Fund Categories: December 1997 Mean and Standard
Deviation of Returns (1990{1997)
1990{1997
Assets Mean Standard Risk-
(US$ Return Deviation adjusted
Category Number billion) (%) (%) Returns
Event-driven 120 8.6 18.9 5.9 3.2
Global 334 30.9 17.7 9.4 1.9
Global/macro 61 29.8 28.1 16.3 1.7
Market neutral 201 18.0 8.6 2.1 4.1
Sectors 40 1.8 29.6 15.9 1.9
Short-sellers 12 0.5 7.0 15.2 0.5
Long-only 15 0.4 27.3 15.4 1.8
Source: Eichengreen et al. (1998, p. 37)
Note:
(a) The mean returns are annually compounded returns over the period 1990 to 1997,
except for the Long-only Funds, which were computed from 1994 to 1997.
(b) The annualized standard deviations were computed from the standard deviation of
monthly returns for each investment style.
(c) Risk-adjusted returns are obtained by dividing the mean return by the standard devi-
ation.
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funds in four geographic areas: Japan, Asia ex-Japan, Asia inclusive of Japan
and Australia.
AsiaHedge currently has reported data of about 150 hedge funds operating
in Asia and Australia and/or investing in the Asia-Pacic markets. These
hedge funds, like their counterparts in the U.S. use long/short, global/macro
and event-driven strategies.
Three interesting features dierentiate hedge funds from other forms of
managed funds. Most of them are small and organized around a few experi-
enced investment professionals. In fact, more than half of U.S Hedge Funds
manage amounts of less than US$25 million. Moreover, most hedge funds
are leveraged. It is estimated that 70 per cent of hedge funds use leverage
and about 18% borrowed more than one dollar for every dollar of capital.1
Another peculiar feature is the short life span of hedge funds. Hedge funds
have an average life span of about 3.5 years.2 Very few have a track record of
more than 10 years. These features lead many to view hedge funds as \risky"
and \opportunistic".
2. What Are Hedge Funds?
\Hedge Funds" is a term coined by a journalist, Carol Loomis, to describe
an innovative investment structure rst created by Alfred Winslow Jones.
Jones had established a fund with unique features: (a) He set up \hedges" by
investing in securities that he determined as undervalued and funding these
positions partly by taking short positions in overvalued securities, creating a
\market neutral" position; (b) He also designed an incentive fee compensation
arrangement in which he was paid a percentage of the prots realized from
his clients’ assets; and (c) He invested his own investment capital in the
fund, ensuring that his incentives and those of his investors were aligned and
forming an investment \partnership".
Currently, most hedge funds retain these features. They are set up as lim-
ited partnerships with a lucrative incentive-fee structure. Hedge fund man-
agers often also have a signicant portion of their own capital invested in
the partnerships.
However, the term \hedge fund" has also been generalized to describe
investment strategies that range from the original \market-neutral" style
of Jones to many other strategies and opportunistic situations, including
global/macro investing, such as the Quantum Fund of George Soros. Soros is
famous for his \attack" on Sterling in September 1992, when he was reported
to have a US$10 billion short position. He made $1 billion when the British
Pound subsequently devalued. Soros shorted the Pound but was long the Yen.
1See Eichengreen and Mathieson, p. 7.
2Stefano Lavinio, p. 128.
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Due to the diversity of the industry, there is no standard method to clas-
sify hedge funds neatly. In the industry, there are at least 8 major databases
set up by data vendors and fund advisors. We follow the classication used by
Eichengreen and Mathieson (1998), who relied on the MAR/Hedge database.
Under this classication, there are 8 categories of hedge funds with 7 dier-
entiated styles and a fund-of-funds category:
(a) Event driven funds. These are funds that take positions on corpo-
rate events, taking an arbitraged position when companies are undergo-
ing re-structuring or mergers. For example, hedge funds would purchase
bank debt or high yield corporate bonds of companies undergoing re-
organization (often referred to as ‘distressed securities’). Another event-
driven strategy is merger arbitrage. These funds seize the opportunity
to invest just after a takeover has been announced. They purchase the
shares of the target companies and short the shares of the acquiring com-
panies. Occasionally, they carried out the reverse if the deal would likely
fail.
(b) Global funds is a catchall category of funds that invest in non-US stocks
and bonds with no specic strategy reference. It has the largest number
of hedge funds. It includes funds that specialize on the emerging markets.
(c) Global/Macro funds refer to funds that rely on macroeconomic anal-
ysis to take bets on major risk factors, such as currencies, interest rates,
stock indices and commodities.
(d) Market neutral funds refer to funds that bet on relative price move-
ments utilizing strategies such as long-short equity, stock index arbitrage,
convertible bond arbitrage and xed income arbitrage. Long-short eq-
uity funds use the strategy of Jones by taking long positions in selective
stocks and going short on other stocks to limit their exposure to the
stock market. Stock index arbitrage funds trade on the spread between
index futures contracts and the underlying basket of equities. Convertible
bond arbitrage funds typically capitalize on the embedded option in these
bonds by purchasing them and shorting the equities. Fixed income arbi-
trage bet on the convergence of prices of bonds from the same issuer but
with dierent maturities over time. This is the second largest grouping
of hedge funds after the Global category.
(e) Sector funds concentrate on selective sectors of the economy. For ex-
ample, they may focus on technology stocks if these are over-priced and
rotate across to other sectors.
(f) Short-sellers focus on engineering short positions in stocks with or with-
out matching long positions. They play on markets that have risen too
fast and on mean reversion strategies.
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(g) Long-only funds take long equity positions typically with leverage.
Emerging market funds that do not have short-selling opportunities also
fall under this category.
(h) Fund of funds refer to funds that invests in a pool of hedge funds. They
specialize in identifying fund managers with good performance and rely
on their good industry relationships to gain entry into hedge funds with
good track records.
Table 1 presents statistics about the various categories of hedge funds and
past performance. The sectoral hedge funds provided the best mean return
over the period studied, while the \market-neutral" funds had the lowest
standard deviation of returns. On a risk-adjusted basis (dividing the mean
return by the standard deviation), the category of fund that ranks highest
is the market neutral funds followed by event-driven funds. But, before this
conclusion is valid, more discussion follows on the empirical problems using
the data obtained from incomplete databases.
3. Why Invest in Hedge Funds?
Traditional asset allocation optimizes the use of equities, bonds, real estate
and private equity to invest in a portfolio that maximizes returns and min-
imizes the portfolio risk. With this objective, hedge funds become a natural
candidate for consideration. Firstly, it is commonly believed that hedge funds
may have superior returns. There are many anecdotal stories about the stun-
ning success of hedge fund managers and their skills. Soros was reported
to have obtained returns in excess of 30% p.a for a good number of years.
From Table 1, there is also apparent evidence that hedge funds, as a group,
have returns that are impressive. For example, over the period 1990{1997, all
the hedge funds had positive absolute returns. Global/Macro funds obtained
mean returns of 28.1% p.a. with a standard deviation that is comparable to
equity funds.
Secondly, hedge funds have returns that are generally believed to be un-
correlated to the traditional asset classes and may even have a lower risk
prole. For example, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (November 2000, p. 1)
reported that hedge funds \exhibit a low correlation with traditional asset
classes, suggesting that hedge funds should play an important role in strate-
gic asset allocation". Table 2 shows a common presentation of the underlying
relationships between hedge funds and the other assets.
Thirdly, in a bear market, many investment mangers nd it uninteresting
to merely beat the market index, which may have negative returns. They
would have preferred to go short or avoid long positions to have positive
returns. Investing in appropriately chosen hedge funds may provide the pos-
sibility of obtaining positive \absolute returns".
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Table 2. Performance Measures For Hedge Fund Indices (Jan 1990{April 2000)
Annualized Annualized Correlation with Correlation with
Return Std Dev S&P 500 Lehman Bro
(%) (%) Gov/Corp
EACM 1001 15.2 4.4 0.37 0.19
Eq Mkt Neutral 9.1 3.2 −0:11 0.15
Eq Hedged 20.6 10.3 0.20 0.00
Event 13.7 5.4 0.48 0.09
Global/Intl 20.8 11.5 0.61 0.15
Source: Lehman Brothers (2000)
Note: 1. The EACM 100 is an index of hedge funds representing a wide range of strategies.
The foregoing provides persuasive reasons to consider hedge funds as
\alternative investments". However, relying on statistics culled from public
databases is fraught with data biases. An uninformed investor may be misled
into common misperceptions about the return and risk of hedge funds. There
is now recent and denitive work by a number of authors that have provided
fascinating revelations about the risk and return proles of hedge funds which
are discussed below.
4. Commercial Databases and Statistical Inferences
4.1. Data collation issues
Organized as private limited partnerships, and frequently as oshore invest-
ment vehicles, hedge funds generally do not disclose their activities to the pub-
lic. This has resulted in frequent complaints about the lack of transparency.
Fortunately, many funds do release selective information to publicize them-
selves and their performance to attract new investors. These data are collected
by a small number of data vendors and fund advisors. A few large advi-
sors and vendors are currently publishing performance data and indices/sub-
indices periodically corresponding to the various investment strategies. A
listing of Hedge Funds Databases and some descriptive details is provided
in the Appendix.
However, voluntary participation in performance reporting leads to in-
completeness of information regarding the hedge fund population as a whole.
Thus, sampling biases are present whenever an investor analyses a hedge
fund database on a stand-alone basis. Some of theses biases are briefly
discussed below.
4.2. Survivorship bias
Databases obviously only include hedge funds that submit information. Funds
that perform poorly often choose not to submit their performance. Thus,
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poorly performing funds are likely to be missing in a database. A \survivor-
ship bias" arises when a database includes only the performance of funds that
are alive and present at the end of the sample period. A subset of survivor-
ship bias, called liquidation bias, occurs when disappearing funds may not
report nal periods leading up to and including their liquidation. If funds
cease operation due to poor performance, the historical returns of surviving
funds in the database is biased upward with risk biased downward relative to
the population of hedge funds.
Hedge funds may exit a database for reasons other than poor performance.
Database vendors often delist funds that do not provide reliable information.
Some popular funds also stop reporting their performance when they have
reached a desired size, and do not need to further solicit \new" money. Omis-
sions of these funds would also severely bias a database.
Brooks and Kat (2001) stated that around 30% of newly established funds
do not survive the rst three years, primarily due to poor performance. Thus,
not including defunct funds is likely to lead to over-estimation of the returns
and prole of the hedge fund industry. Fung and Hsieh (2001a) found that
estimates of survivorship biases diered across two commonly used databases,
HFR and TASS. The survivorship bias (and attrition rate) was much higher
in TASS than that in HFR. They estimated that survivorship bias would
over-report hedge fund mean returns by about 1.5% to 3% per annum.
4.3. Selection bias
Database vendors impose their own criteria before a hedge fund may enter
their database. The criteria would include the type of fund involved, track
record and assets under management. Databases may also exclude types of
hedge funds whose trading activities or instruments do not meet their criteria.
Again, the result is a likely upward bias in the database, which has become a
biased sample belonging to the larger population.3
Data collation and statistical biases present problems when generalizations
have to be made about the returns and risk across the dierent categories of
hedge funds. These biases also aect the computation of hedge fund indices.
Since this is so, statistical inferences about the performance of hedge fund
returns and the returns on hedge fund indices may not be reliable.
Brooks and Kat (2001) provided evidence to support this view. They
showed that dierent databases have dierent sample statistics for similar
categories of funds. Table 3 shows that the mean return for macro hedge
3Park (1995) analyzes a subset of selection bias termed \instant history bias". This bias
arises because when a new fund is rst included, database managers often \back-ll" its
performance history. Up to a year or more of data may be added to the database. Again,
another sampling bias is added onto the database.
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Table 3. Hedge Fund Indices from Dierent Databases Mean and Standard
Deviation of Returns (Jan 1995{Apr 2001)
Category/Database Mean (%) Standard
Deviation (%)
Risk Arbitrage1 14.13
Zurich2 13.2 12.8
Hennesse 13.0 11.8
Tuna 14.9 12.4
Altvest 15.6 13.4
HFR 13.6 12.7
Macro 13.3
Zurich 10.2 19.3
Hennesse 10.4 30.6
HFR 13.2 28.1
CSFB/Tremont 17.2 50.2
Tuna 15.6 33.8
Altvest 17.0 32.6
Van 9.4 41.8
Equity Market Neutral 12.8
Zurich 11.9 6.5
Hennesse 8.5 10.4
HFR 10.9 13.3
CSFB/Tremont 13.7 10.8
Tuna 15.2 19.2
HFR 16.8 17.2
Market Indices
S&P 500 18.6 54.4
DJIA 18.1 54.7
Russell 2000 13.7 69.1
NASDAQ 21.6 106.9
Lehman Government Bond 7.4 10.3
Source: Brooks & Kat (2001)
Note:
1. The major databases are explained in the Appendix
2. Zurich Capital Markets compute the indices using the MAR/Hedge database that it
acquired in March 2001.
3. Simple Average of returns estimated using the dierent databases.
funds computed by the various databases ranges from 10.2% to 17.2%. Yet,
this is a statistic for a common class of hedge funds over the same time-period.
More interestingly, the standard deviation ranges from 19.3% to 50.2%. This
is compelling evidence for the investor to be wary about obtaining statistics
from hedge fund databases and making statistical inferences.
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5. Nature of Hedge Funds, Trading Strategies and
Performance Measurements
5.1. Mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis
It is clear that because of the method of collection and reporting of the hedge
fund databases, there are biases in the data collected. Some of the returns can
be viewed as the upper bound and the averages are likely to be smaller than
actually reported. The wide range in returns and dispersion indicates that
the mean and variance may not capture the full picture regarding the activi-
ties of hedge funds. Indeed, the organizational structure of hedge funds, their
investment objectives, trading strategies and managerial compensation dif-
ferentiate them signicantly from the usual mutual fund. Most mutual funds
are generally engaged in \buy-and-hold activities" | acquiring and manag-
ing stocks and bonds over a longer period of time. Although some mutual
funds would engage in activities like leverage or short-sell, most do not.
There is now increasing evidence that hedge fund returns and hedge fund
indices returns are not normally distributed. And, it is the strategies of hedge
fund investments that have directly contributed to this situation. Typically,
hedge fund investments are based on absolute return strategies. They are
expected to deliver performance regardless of market conditions. To do so,
hedge fund managers use two main approaches to achieve absolute return
targets: (a) directional (or market timing) and (b) non-directional approaches.
The directional approach dynamically bets on the expected directions of
the markets. Funds will invest long or sell-short securities to capture gains
from their advance and decline. In contrast, the non-directional approach
attempts to extract value from a set of embedded arbitrage opportunities
within and across securities. The non-directional approach typically exploits
structural anomalies in the nancial market.
Mean-variance analysis is appropriate when returns are normally dis-
tributed or investors’ preferences are quadratic. The reliability of mean-
variance analysis therefore depends on the degree of non-normality of the
returns data and the nature of the (non-quadratic) utility function. While
the utility function may not be a serious problem, the non-normal distribu-
tion of returns presents an issue.
According to Fung and Hsieh (1999a), \: : : when returns are not normally
distributed (as it is the case for hedge funds), the rst two moments (i.e. mean
and standard deviation) are not sucient to give an accurate probability."
Fung and Hsieh found that hedge fund returns are leptokurtic or fat-tailed.
One likely explanation is that net returns include spreads that are distributed
with fat tails.
Brooks and Kat (2001) found that hedge fund index returns are also not
normally distributed. Many hedge fund indices exhibit relatively low skewness
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and high kurtosis, especially in the case of funds investing in convertible arbi-
trage, risk arbitrage and distressed securities. These are non-normal proles.
Brooks and Kat argued that, while hedge funds may oer relatively high
means and low variances, such funds give investors third and fourth moment
attributes that are exactly the opposite to those that are desirable. Investors
obtained a better mean and a lower variance in return for more negative skew-
ness and higher kurtosis. There is no free lunch. These issues complicate a
clear conclusion on the return and risk of hedge funds as an asset class for
investment by even the most experienced investors.
Generally, the dynamic trading strategies of hedge funds render traditional
mean-variance measures relatively meaningless. While some hedge funds may
have low standard deviations, this does not mean they are relatively \risk-
less". In fact, they harbor skewness and kurtosis, which may be overwhelm-
ingly \risky".
5.2. Correlations of returns
Fung and Hsieh (1997) examined the returns of hedge funds and commodity
trading advisers. They conrmed that hedge fund managers and commodity
trading advisers generate returns that have low correlations to the returns of
mutual funds and standard asset classes. This is the benet often cited by
portfolio managers in their choice of hedge funds as an \alternative invest-
ment". Having an additional asset with a low or negative correlation permits
the diversication of risk in a means-variance environment.
However, there are complications that arise in the case of hedge funds
where correlation-based diversication may not be valid. Lavino (2000, p. 177)
argued that many hedge funds are not consistently and continuously nega-
tively or poorly correlated with other asset classes over time. Hedge funds may
also not have meaningful standard deviations. In fact, many hedge funds have
distributions with fat-tails, that is, exceptional events are more frequent than
those which would have been predicted based on normality assumptions. This
negates the use of correlation as a gauge to execute portfolio diversication.
Fung and Hsieh (2001) stated that \: : : Risk management in the presence
of dynamic trading strategies is also more complex." Hedge fund managers
have a great deal of freedom to generate returns that are uncorrelated with
those of other asset classes. But, this freedom comes at a price. Dynamic
trading strategies predispose hedge funds to extreme or tail events. Thus, cor-
relations may come at a cost. They cautioned that \periodically the portfolio
can become overly concentrated in a small number of markets" and market
exposures converge. This would lead to an \implosion" due to diversication.
Andrew Lo (2001) reinforced this view. He explained that many investors
participate in hedge funds to diversify their returns, as hedge fund returns
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seem uncorrelated with market indexes such as S&P 500. However, uncorre-
lated events can become synchronized in a crisis, with correlation changing
from 0 to 1 overnight. These situations are examples of \phase-locking" be-
havior encountered in physical and natural science.
We conclude that using means and standard deviations to report the re-
turns and risks of hedge funds is not adequate. Providing skewness and kur-
tosis statistics would be helpful. Relying on simple correlation measures to
diversify portfolio risks is not appropriate when deciding to add hedge funds
to a portfolio of other assets.
6. Some Suggested Measures to Measure Risk and Return
Frank Sortino and Lee Price (1994) have proposed evaluating downside risks
rather than total risks. They dened a new measure and termed it the Sortino
Ratio. This is similar to the Sharpe Ratio, except that it uses ‘downside
deviation’ instead of using standard deviation as the denominator.
The Sortino Ratio was developed to dierentiate between deviations on
the upside and on the downside and is more consistent with the investors’
concern over risk of losses in their investments. The Sortino ratio also allows
for the setting of a user-dened return benchmark where the numerator is the
dierence between the return on the portfolio and the Minimum Acceptable
Return (MAR). The MAR is usually the risk free rate, zero or user-dened
(for example, 5%).
We have earlier highlighted that the high skewness of a hedge fund’s re-
turns may be connected to the hedge fund manager’s selection of high-reward
and low variance opportunities. Lavinio (1999) has dened another measure
to capture this, as follows:
d Ratio = Abs(d=U)
where,
d = number of returns less than zero times their value
U = number of returns greater than zero times their value
Abs = absolute value :
The d Ratio compares the value and frequency of a manager’s winners to losers
to capture the skewness in returns. This statistic, which does not require any
assumption of the underlying distribution, may be used as a proxy for a fund’s
risk, with d = 0 representing a distribution with no downside, and d = innity
representing one in which the manager does not make any positive returns.
In analyzing the performance of hedge fund managers, we also need to
gain insights into the permanence of a manager’s skill. One way to examine
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if good performance is merely transitory is to see if it is mean-reverting (i.e.
whether the performance will reverse and converge toward some predictable
long-term value). We can capture this with the Hurst Ratio,4 which is dened
as follows:
Hurst Ratio = logM=(logN − log a)
where
M(t) = (max(t)−min(t))=S(t)
N = length of shorter sub-periods into which a
manager0s return record has been sub-divided
t = number of sub-periods into which a manager0s
return record has been sub-divided
S(t) = standard deviation of data over sub-period t
a = constant term that is negligible if track record
is ve years or less :
A Hurst Ratio between 0 and 0.5 means that a manager’s return will
tend to fluctuate randomly, but converge to a stable value over time. With
a Hurst Ratio around 0.5, a hedge fund manager’s track performance will
be regarded as totally random, i.e. returns in one period are not aected by
returns in another period. Such hedge funds are deemed to be \risky" as any
stellar short-term gains may be accompanied by substantial losses in another
time period.
Hurst Ratios, which are between 0.5 and 1, describe returns that are per-
sistent. These fund managers have \hot" hands. We should, however, inter-
pret such ndings with care, as there is a need to examine whether the same
manager can maintain his fund’s Hurst Ratio in future time-periods that are
beyond the chosen sampling periods. More rigorous testing is required with
out-of-sample data to provide meaningful conclusions.
Though the Sortino, d and Hurst Ratios would provide additional insights
to the performance and risk of hedge fund investing, further work is needed
before these analytical methods can be used to report on the risk and return
performance of hedge funds. In the next section, we examine some practical
issues that complicate hedge fund performance.
4Lo (1991) applied the Hurst Ratio to stock returns and found that short-range dependence
adequately captured the time series behavior of stock returns.
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7. Practical Issues
We have seen that data issues may unwittingly lead to meaningless compar-
isons of hedge fund performance. However, even if one possesses a set of clean
and reliable data, it is unlikely that there will be a statistically computed
measure of risk-adjusted return, which would satisfy a sophisticated investor.
Hedge funds performance measures are beset by many practical business is-
sues, which make it extremely dicult to have a simple measure to fully
convey risk and return.
Specically, hedge funds face many practical issues that increase their
\riskiness". For ease of exposition, we have identied at least 6 types of prac-
tical issues that confound risk and return measurements: style purity, consis-
tency, fund size, use of leverage, liquidity and asset concentration. We note
that some of these problems are closely linked to one another and create ex-
traneous risks, which may not be correctly priced by the usual risk- adjusted
return measures.
Firstly, many hedge funds are assumed to have a pure and consistent style.
This is rarely the case. Many funds may be opportunistic and operate with
more than one style. Thus, many hedge funds do not always function exactly
as their self-reported classications indicate. From the outside looking in, it
is almost impossible to classify hedge funds neatly.
A hedge fund’s style purity over time is denitely less consistent when
compared to Unit Trusts (and mutual funds), which by nature are \buy-and-
hold" accounts. Fung and Hsieh (2001b) and others have suggested using
factor analysis to discern the underlying dimensions or \factors" that drive the
returns for funds. This may, then, go below the surface to determine unique
hedge fund strategies that dierentiate one fund from another. Hopefully, this
would enable an investor to detect style purity, style consistency and most
importantly, style deviations.
Hillary Till (2001a and 2001b) suggested that a number of hedge fund
strategies might appear to \earn their returns due to assuming risk positions
in a risk-averse nancial world, rather than from ineciencies in the market
place". In this sense, returns are made from a \risk transfer", and not due
to managerial abilities per se. If indeed this is the case, then the skill of
selecting the appropriate hedge fund styles and the type of managers who
can execute the styles consistently, and how to allocate funds across these
managers become important to achieve superior returns. Viewed from this
standpoint, style purity and consistency are important attributes to measure
exposure to hedge fund risks rather than statistical measures like variance
and skewness.
A hedge fund’s asset under management (\AUM") growth may be (a)
internally generated through performance, (b) externally induced because of
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inflows, or (c) magnied through use of higher leverage. Hedge fund size is
a dimension that has signicant implications for risk and return. A hedge
fund’s risks increases proportionately with its AUM. This is because the use
of specialized strategies naturally limits a hedge fund to some \optimal size"
beyond which it becomes increasingly dicult to keep the same strategy or
have the opportunities for execution (often with leverage). We observe that
hedge fund managers are inclined to close their funds for further investments
as soon as a target size is reached. This is evidence that many managers
understand the trade-os between size and performance. Yet, many often
neglect to focus on the relationship between size and risks.
Hedge fund managers are drawn to the use of leverage to magnify po-
tential returns from small arbitrage opportunities. They are also inclined to
concentrate their investable funds in a small subset of potentially \rich" op-
portunities. Weisman and Abernathy (2000) demonstrated the importance of
guarding against excessive leverage, which is compounded by a lack of liq-
uidity when a disastrous event strikes. They pointed out that if one were to
construct a non-diversied, illiquid and/or leveraged portfolio and let it grow
over time, it would eventually lead to bankruptcy of the fund, if a misfor-
tune strikes. The potential risk is very high employing these strategies. The
perceived risk may be low, as a well-constructed, downside-oriented measure
using past data may not reveal the potential risks from the occurrence of a
future disastrous event. This is because a misfortune has not yet struck. But
the potential risks, which are usually unforeseen, are large and threaten the
eventual survival of the fund.
8. Accounting for Various Sources of Risk
Assume that we have two hedge funds with similar statistical attributes: the
same average holding period returns adjusted by its standard deviation. We
want to know which fund has a better \risk-adjusted" return. Let us further
assume that the rst fund (compared to the second) is less leveraged, invests in
more liquid assets, is less concentrated/ more diversied, and more disciplined
in its application of investment styles. We are, most likely, very inclined to
prefer the rst fund to the second. That is because the second fund, although
it has the same average return adjusted by its standard deviation, has taken
extraneous risk to achieve the same results. This is especially more obvious
if analyzed in the context of possible disastrous events. Thus, depending on
the strategy employed, it is generally correct to say that a non-leveraged,
more liquid, more diversied and more disciplined fund has a better chance
of survival in the long term.
Perhaps, the crucial question has now become more obvious: how to mod-
ify \risk-adjusted returns" to account for the many other forms of risks not
captured statistically. Generally, \risk-adjusted return" is dened as:
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Observed Returns− Benchmark Returns
Indicated Risk Measure
This measure assumes that all the named variables are observable, measurable
and reliable. The benchmark return may be a stock index, a contrived peer
measure or the 90- day Treasury Bill rate of interest. The risk measure may
be the \tracking error", \standard deviation", or some other measure.
From the foregoing, we are sanguine that this risk-adjusted measure will
be able to tell the whole story. We propose, instead, a new metric to account
for the numerous risks faced by a hedge fund investor. We dene:
Risk Adjusted Return
=
(Observed Returns− Benchmark Returns) Penalty Function
Indicated Risk Measure
Without delving into the statistical properties in this paper, we postulate
that the Penalty Function is a discount factor that takes into account various
dimensions such as hedge fund style (purity and consistency), size, leverage,
liquidity and asset concentration. These dimensions penalize the statistically
measured risk-adjusted returns of hedge funds. Table 4 itemizes the risk di-
mensions and suggests avenues to discount them in the penalty function.
It should be noted that the leverage, liquidity and concentration measures
require additional data supplied by hedge fund managers. This calls for more
disclosure and transparency from the hedge fund managers.
While no single performance measure can be complete, we argue that a
properly constructed \risk-adjusted return with penalty" that has accounted
for practical business risks is more meaningful to an investor. A return that
is merely adjusted by standard deviations cannot alert an investor to such
risks as leverage or liquidity, which had been undertaken (to achieve the re-
turns). Using a penalty function would provide a handle to scale the observed
return for the many practical risks that had been assumed by the hedge fund
manager. Even identifying the components that will constitute the penalty
function would be a worthwhile exercise to avoid the pitfalls of investing in
hedge funds.
9. Conclusions
This paper presented an overview of hedge funds, describing their develop-
ment and characteristics. It also surveys some of the pitfalls that investors
face when they try to make investment decisions using hedge fund data from
commercial sources. Given the dynamic trading strategies and the complexity
of hedge fund investments, commonly used statistics such as the mean, stan-
dard deviation and correlations are not meaningful. These statistics must be
used with extreme caution as the underlying distribution of hedge fund re-
turns (and also the returns of hedge fund indices) is not normally distributed.
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Table 4.
Discount to Risk-Adjusted Returns to Account for Various Types of Practical Risk
Sources Of Risks To Penalise for Suggested Measurement method Predicted Discount to Returns
Style Purity Deviation from Self-reported Invest-
ment Style
Deviation from Style Benchmark The higher the style \impurity" the
higher the discount
Asset Growth Unexpected increases in Fund Size
(and Assets Under Management)
Change in Fund Size The higher the increase in fund
size in the period under review, the
higher the discount
Leverage Excessive Leverage (a) Average gross exposure, (b) Ac-
tive Use of Leverage (Computed
from a comparison of returns with
and without the use of leverage fol-
lowing the standards recommended
by the Association for Investment
Management and Research)
The higher the use of leverage the
higher the discount
Liquidity Low Asset Liquidity (a) Average Day to Complete Sales,
(b) Ratio of Position to Trading Vol-
ume
The higher the threat of \illiquidity"
the higher the discount
Asset concentration (a) Single Security Exposure, (b)
Erratic Returns
(a) Average Percentage
of 10 Largest Holding over report-
ing period, (b) Fractal Dimension or
Inverse of Hurst Coecient
The higher the asset concentration
the higher the discount
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This paper has suggested 3 other metrics that may be useful: Sortino,
d, and the Hurst Ratios. However, more empirical work is needed before
they are used. A future paper will provide some empirical results relating to
these measures.
Without specifying the mathematical form, we venture further to account
for various other sources of risk such as style purity, style consistency, size,
leverage, liquidity, and asset concentration. We also suggested a \penalty
function" for the risks from these sources. The statistical properties of this
penalty as well as illustrations using real data are left for future work.
We conclude by noting that many authors have pointed to the limited use
of statistical measures and have suggested option-based analytical approaches
to evaluate hedge fund performance. In particular, the works by Hsieh and
Fung (1997, 1999b) and Agarwal and Naik (1999) have discussed these av-
enues to provide insights into these complex but crucial issues in hedge funds
investing. In this paper, we have also suggested using more dimensions to
alert investors to the numerous sources of unseen risks when they invest in
hedge funds. This is a promising direction for more research.
Appendix
List of Commercial Hedge Fund Databases
Name Description Features of Indices
HFR
(www.hfr.com)
Hedge Fund Research (HFR) is a
hedge fund research and consult-
ing rm that has collected data
on around 4,000 dierent hedge
funds.
Around 1,500 funds are used
to calculate 33 indices that
reflect the monthly net of fee
returns on equally weighted
baskets of funds.
Zurich Capital Markets
(www.marhedge.com)
Originally developed by Man-
aged Accounts Reports (MAR)
but it was sold to Zurich Capi-
tal Markets in Mar 2001.
Database contains 1,500
hedge funds, which are used
to calculate 19 indices that
reflect median monthly net
of fee returns.
CSFB/Tremont
(www.hedgeindex.com)
The TASS database tracks
around 2,600 funds. There are
strict rules for fund selection.
The universe consists only of
funds with a minimum of USD
10m under management and a
current audited nancial state-
ment. Funds are reselected quar-
terly as necessary.
Using a subset of around 650
funds, CSFB/Tremont cal-
culates 10 indices that the
monthly net of fee returns
on an asset-weighted basket
of funds. Large fund have
a larger influence in these
indices.
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List of Commercial Hedge Fund Databases (continued)
Name Description Features of Indices
Hennesse
(www.henessegroup.com)
The Hennesse Group is a
hedge fund advisory rm
that maintains a database
of around 3000 funds.
Based of subset of about
500 funds, Hennessee cal-
culates 23 indices that
reflect the monthly net
of fee returns on equally
weighted basket of funds.
Van
(www.vanhedge.com)
Van Hedge Fund Advisors
is a hedge fund advisory
rm with a database of
about 3,400 funds.
Using a subset of around
500 funds, Van calculates
15 indices that reflect the
monthly net of fees returns
on equally-weighted bas-
kets of funds.
Altvest
(www.altvest.com)
Altvest is hedge fund
website that provides in-
formation on alternative
investments. The Altvest
database contains infor-
mation on around 2000
hedge funds.
Altvest calculates 14
equally weighted indices
from the monthly net of
fee returns of the funds in
its database.
TUNA
(www.hedgefund.net)
Hedgefund.net is a website
providing free hedge fund
information and perfor-
mance data. Its database
covers 1,800 hedge funds.
Hedgefund.net calculates
35 equally weighted in-
dices from the monthly
net of fee returns of the
funds in its database. In
Tuna’s case, if a fund
shuts down, it is com-
pletely removed from the
indices.5
AsiaHedge
(www.hedgefundintelligence.com)
AsiaHedge is a subscrip-
tion database that pro-
vides information on
hedge fund industry in the
Asia Pacic Region. Pub-
lishes a league table of 156
funds.
AsiaHedge establish the
Bank of Bermuda Asia-
Hedge indices. There are
4 indices to measure the
performance of hedge
funds in 4 geographies
based on the median net
of fee returns of funds in
its league table.
Source: Brooks and Kat (2001), Hedge Fund Intelligence
5Estimated returns may suer from survivor bias (ranging from 1.5{3%). Around 30%
of newly established funds do not survive beyond 3 years. Most data vendors (with the
exception of TUNA) do incorporate funds that have ceased to exist in their index to avoid
this.
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